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NEXT REVIEW DATE:

AUTH. HB 70-2

DATE: 250381 REVIEWER: 

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

9 February 1954

SUBJECT : Policy on Exploitation of Soviet Vulnerabilities

General Cutler sent you on 15 January a working paper which proposed a study to recommend whether the NSC should address itself to elaborating a statement of U. S. policy on the exploitation of Soviet vulnerabilities. It proposed the creation by the NSC of an ad hoc committee consisting of Cutler, General Smith, C.D. Jackson and yourself, who would, in turn, organize a special committee of representatives from State, Defense, CIA, and JCS. This latter committee would go into the whole question of current policies, current plans, operations and thinking within the agencies and departments concerned and come up with recommendations to the parent ad hoc committee, and through them to the NSC, as to whether further NSC action was desirable. The description of the scope of this study indicates that the people working on it would have to have access to knowledge of all our most sensitive operational activities and assets.

Apparently you discussed this matter in General Smith's office some time during the week of January 18-23, and, as a result of that discussion, General Cutler sent you on 26 January another piece of paper which proposed that that section of the OCB Staff which is known as "C.D. Jackson's Special Staff" should first make a staff study which would include a "summary presentation of accepted U. S. policies and practices for the exploitation of Soviet vulnerabilities as formulated by the departments and agencies concerned," a summary of other materials and studies which are utilized as guidance, and a statement of those aspects of U. S. policy which appear to need further development. I gathered from Koons, Cutler's assistant, that the OCB Special Staff would undertake this study by itself and without Agency participation, and that the group which would eventually report to the NSC would not come into existence until after the Special Staff study was completed.

The proposed terms of reference of this staff study are attached. I believe it is expected that you will comment on them directly to General Cutler. I confess that my own reaction to the whole proposal is somewhat negative. To be sure, a summary of "Accepted U. S. Policy and Practices" and of the results of previous investigations might be useful and would at worst be innocuous; it would certainly be far preferable to the rather extensive, high level study originally proposed by General Cutler. But I seriously doubt whether anything very new or useful will be turned up by another study of Soviet vulnerabilities and of the means of exploiting them.

We have had not only the rather comprehensive CENIS study but also the work we will shortly complete in  and a large flow of continuing studies in private research organizations, in the  and elsewhere. As to the means of exploitation, this is after all the focus of

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25X1 the [ ] Project and we are far enough along with it to convince me that there are few, if any, important areas of policy which have not at least been explored one time or another. The feeling persists, I know, that there must be something quite significant, and (hopefully) relatively inexpensive, that we could do to exploit the weaknesses of a monolithic, over-centralized society if only we were clever enough to discover it. Certainly the vulnerabilities of such a society should be under constant study. Nevertheless, I am inclined to believe that the sort of major new project originally proposed by General Cutler would be a waste of intellectual and executive resources and should be discouraged.

25X1 Under the circumstances, I would suggest that if you comment orally to General Cutler you may wish to express some skepticism about another major examination of policy while agreeing that the preliminary staff study of present policy would be helpful. Assuming that the latter is to go forward, however, I would think it desirable to have some one from the Agency at least affiliated with it from its beginning. This will give us the background that we should have if any subsequent work is to be undertaken and, more important, it would give some one representing this Agency an opportunity to see what the Special Staff was doing, particularly in informing itself as to the policy and practices followed by this Agency. [ ] discussed this sort of arrangement briefly with Koons who saw no objection to it.

One more specific suggestion I would make is that General Cutler and the members of the OCB be reminded of the terms of reference of [ ] and that any preliminary findings of that Project which might be helpful to the staff study be made available informally to the Special Staff.

If you agree with this point of view, I would suggest that you advise General Cutler along the lines of the attached. If you wish me to follow the staff study for the Agency, I will try to inform myself as to the amount of time that will be required. If it is very considerable, I may ask to borrow part of the time of one of the men now assigned to [ ] to represent me in meetings with the OCB Special Staff.

[ ]  
RICHARD M. BISSELL  
Special Assistant to DCI

Attachment  
Secret Memo to  
Robert Cutler

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THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

January 26, 1954

NSC REVIEW  
COMPLETED,  
10/31/04

Dear Allen:

You will remember our discussion in Bedell's office last week relative to a project to develop a policy for exploiting Soviet vulnerabilities.

C. D. Jackson's OCB Special Staff group has come up with the attached terms of reference for pulling together the material on this subject. Before he left, C. D. saw them and felt that this was the correct approach. They seem satisfactory to me, as long as the Group's final report is concise and in the neighborhood of about 20 pages.

You and Bedell may have some further ideas and suggested changes, following which I think they can get under way.

C. D. suggested that Skip Koons work with the Group, which he can do within the limits of his normal work over here.

Sincerely yours,



ROBERT CUTLER  
Special Assistant  
to the President

Attachment

The Honorable Allen W. Dulles  
Director, Central Intelligence Agency  
2430 E Street, N.W.  
Washington 25, D.C.

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1. In order further to clarify the desirability of possible development of U.S. policy on the exploitation of Soviet vulnerabilities by the NSC, and problems related thereto, the Special Staff of the OCB is directed to undertake a staff study to include the following:

- a. Summary presentation of accepted U.S. policy and practices for the exploitation of Soviet vulnerabilities as formulated by the departments and agencies concerned (Admiral Stevens' report, etc.).
- b. Summary presentation of other major material which though not accepted as official policy may to some extent be utilized as guidance (CEMIS), together with the status of such studies or materials within the government and the areas of agreement or disagreement concerning their substance.
- c. Summary statement of those aspects of U.S. policy in this regard where there appears to be a need for the further development of existing policy or provision of new policy.

2. In the event that the staff study indicates the necessity of either a comprehensive or specific development of U.S. policy for exploitation of Soviet vulnerabilities either by the NSC or other appropriate means, the Special Staff can make recommendations as to methods and procedure.

3. Staff study to be submitted by May 1.

4. The Special Staff is to be given full cooperation by the appropriate departments and agencies in developing the above study.

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP

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Remarks: Attached is the paper on Soviet  
Vulnerabilities which the Director was holding  
for Dick Bissell.

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON


January 15, 1954

The Honorable Allen W. Dulles  
Director, Central Intelligence Agency  
2430 E Street, N.W.  
Washington, D.C.

Dear Mr. Dulles:


Attached please find the draft  
working paper mentioned to you by Mr. Cutler  
which might serve as a basis for discussion  
next Tuesday.

Sincerely yours,



T. B. EVANS  
NSC Special Staff

Attachment

Document No. 10  
Review of this document by CIA has  
determined that  
☐ CIA has no objection to declass  
☐ It contains information of CIA  
interest that must remain  
classified at TS S G  
Authority: HR 78-2  
☐ It contains nothing of CI  
Date 2-25-80 Reviewer 





DRAFT

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January 14, 1954

U. S. POLICY ON THE EXPLOITATION OF SOVIET VULNERABILITIES

1. Purpose. Although various NSC policies, such as *(Basic Nat Security Policy)* NSC 162/2, *(Policy towards European Satellite)* NSC 171/1 and the NSC 10/2 Series have to a certain extent taken note of

the existence of Soviet vulnerabilities and the desirability of their exploitation by the United States, there does not exist a comprehensive statement of U.S. policy by the NSC on this subject. The lack of such policy has in the past presented certain problems inhibiting action in this field and is apt to continue to do so until corrected. Furthermore, in those instances where the subject has been dealt with in NSC papers, such as NSC 162 and NSC 171, the inadequacy of treatment has resulted in generalizations, and even contradictions, which do not represent sufficient guidance. Consideration by the National Security Council of a detailed policy on this area of activity should contribute to a better appreciation of the measures necessitated to meet the Soviet threat by providing necessary information to the Council on U.S. capabilities in this field and actions which should be taken by the U.S. government accordingly.

2. Organization. An ad hoc committee comprised of the Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, the Undersecretary of State, the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, and Mr. C.D. Jackson will undertake to organize, and subsequently to provide any other necessary arrangements for, a special committee under the National Security Council to study and make appropriate recommendations

Document No. 10  
Review of this document by CIA has determined that

- ☐ CIA has no objection to declass  
☐ It contains information of CIA interest that must remain classified at TS (S) C

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- ☐ It contains nothing of CIA interest

Reviewer

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on United States exploitation of Soviet vulnerabilities. The committee will be composed of one representative each from the Department of State, Department of Defense, Central Intelligence Agency and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, supplemented by appropriate specialists having competence in the field, but who may not of necessity be presently within the government. Departmental representatives should be from the highest possible level, having competence in the field. Due to the fact that the pressure of their existing obligations may not permit them to devote their full time to the project, they should provide alternates to represent them in their absence.

In the course of its work the committee should have full and free access to current plans, operations and thinking, within the agencies and departments concerned. Departmental representatives on the committee should, to the degree possible, act as informed but not instructed representatives from their particular department or agency. As appropriate, the committee should be able to call upon any necessary agencies for assistance in the preparation of materials, the loan of advisers or other necessary assistance. Although not a member of the committee, a USIA representative should be available for consultation as appropriate. The chairman of the committee should be a man of outstanding reputation and confidence, with experience within the field of government, although it is not thought necessary that he be a specialist in the field of Soviet vulnerabilities, or presently associated with the government.

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The committee should acquaint itself with present U.S. activities designed to exploit Soviet vulnerabilities. It should further consider any new policies, programs or actions which might be suggested by the committee's own work or other sources, regardless of whether the latter currently form part of present governmental plans or operations. In this respect, for example, the committee should review the COMINT studies. Upon completion of its work, the committee will be expected to formulate for Planning Board consideration policy recommendations and appropriate courses of action concerning U.S. exploitation of Soviet vulnerabilities. The participating agencies will be asked for their official views on the report for simultaneous consideration. A subsequent determination will be necessary as to whether or not consideration of the committee's work will be restricted to a part of the Planning Board and/or Council.

Special security arrangements should apply both to selection of the committee members and to the conduct of its work. It is contemplated that these arrangements will be the responsibility of the NSC Representative on Internal Security in cooperation with the security officers of the appropriate agencies. Space in the NSC offices will be provided for the committee, and a member of the NSC Staff will serve as executive secretary. The participating departments or agencies may be called upon to provide clerical or other assistance to the committee, if required.

3. Time Allotted. Necessity of a thorough study of the subject matter points to the desirability of allotting sufficient time for the

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committee's work. The goal should be completion of the committee's report and consideration by the Planning Board and Council in sufficient time so that any changes in programming which might result can be reflected in the fiscal 1956 budget. The committee should project its work so that it will be able to utilize studies authorized by the Operations Coordinating Board on the effectiveness of U.S. international broadcasting, as well as any pertinent technical studies undertaken by the NSAS.

4. Proposed Terms of Reference for Special Committee. Upon completion of its work of reviewing and developing U.S. policy for the exploitation of Soviet vulnerabilities, the committee will be expected to formulate for Planning Board consideration policy recommendations and appropriate courses of action to cover the following three assumptions concerning the Soviet regime:

- a. No basic change in the present nature of the Soviet regime or its internal and external policies;
- b. Evolution of the Soviet regime, or of its conduct of domestic and foreign affairs, of such a nature as to be conducive to an acceptable peaceful accommodation of U.S. and free world interests with those of the Soviet Union;
- c. The advent of general war.

Under assumption a., the committee should examine the possibility and desirability of influencing by U.S. actions the development of a situation which might bring about the situation which would exist under alternative b. The committee should equally consider the possibility that the situation

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as described in b, is unlikely to come about with or without positive U.S. action to that end. The committee should, as a major portion of its task, weigh the impending alternative policies and courses of action suggested by these two assumptions, and develop policy and program recommendations in accordance with their conclusions.

The committee should give particular attention to the vulnerabilities inherent in the Russian-nationalities problem within the USSR, with a view to making special recommendations whether or not the United States should continue a policy of non-prodetermination and self-determination towards the Soviet peoples in activities designed to exploit Soviet vulnerabilities, whether it should support and foster movements aimed at eventual independence and separation of the various nationalities of the Soviet Union, or such other alternative policies that the committee may see fit to propose. The committee should pay particular concern to any possibilities which may exist for aiding by U.S. action a change in the character of the Soviet regime which might be in the interest of the United States (i.e., army coup d'etat).

While the committee should confine itself primarily to the exploitation of Soviet Union vulnerabilities, it is recognized that the exploitation of satellite vulnerabilities directly contributes to the former. Accordingly the committee should consider as appropriate, and in relation to the Soviet Union, the exploitation of satellite vulnerabilities.

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The committee should pay particular attention to considering the proper role of the exploitation of Soviet vulnerabilities within the framework of the new defensive posture and strategy being developed by the United States, and note the priorities or emphasis which is considered proper for the various elements of programs to exploit Soviet vulnerabilities.

THK/via

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